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I guess a more elaborate explanation would be:

Consider the i_th player's action to be x_i. In order to achieve Nash Equilibrium, I apply 'assuming other players have played their strategies what is my best response?'

-> | (3/200) * ( x_1 + x_2 + ... x_50 ) - x_i | = 0

-> Summation of all other player's action = (x_i)*

where (x_i)* is i_th player's best response strategy.

So we have 50 equations like this.

(x_2)* + (x_3)* + (x_4)* ..... (x_50)* = (x_1)* ----------- Equation 1

(x_1)* + (x_3)* + (x_4)* ..... (x_50)* = (x_2)* ----------- Equation 2

(x_1)* + (x_2)* + (x_4)* ..... (x_50)* = (x_3)* ----------- Equation 3

....

...

...

(x_1)* + (x_2)* + (x_3)* ..... (x_49)* = (x_50)* ----------- Equation 50

Add all the equations up. You get:

49 * ((x_1)* + (x_2)* + (x_3)* ..... (x_50)*) = ((x_1)* + (x_2)* + (x_3)* ..... (x_50)*) ----------- Final equation

because on the LHS each variable is missing only once, i.e., in its own equation. This gives us:

((x_1)* + (x_2)* + (x_3)* ..... (x_50)*) = 0

which implies all the best responses have to be 0.

So each player's best response have to be 0.

Note these are simultaneous equations. Each player is playing his/her best response at the same time giving us the 50 equations.

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Always coming up with great solutions ! Loved it

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